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Abstract 
 
 We	  propose	  an	  alternative	  to	  the	  LIBOR	  based	  on	  three	  pillars.	  1)	  Banks	  that	  participate	  in	  the	  rate	  setting	  process	  would	  have	  to	  submit	  bid	  and	  ask	  quotes	  for	  interbank	  lending	  and	  commit	  that	  they	  would	  conduct	  transactions	  within	  that	  range.	  If	  they	  traded	  outside	  of	  those	  ranges	  they	  would	  have	  to	  justify	  and	  face	  a	  penalty.	  	  This	  leads	  to	  the	  CLIBOR—for	  “committed”	  LIBOR.	  (2)	  All	  large	  banks	  would	  have	  to	  submit	  interbank	  transactions	  including	  rates	  to	  a	  data-­‐clearing	  house.	  The	  data-­‐clearing	  house	  would	  use	  the	  actual	  transactions	  to	  verify	  the	  commitment	  of	  the	  banks	  to	  the	  submitted	  rates.	  It	  would	  also	  report	  aggregate	  transaction	  data,	  keeping	  the	  actual	  identities	  of	  the	  trading	  parties	  anonymous,	  with	  a	  necessary	  time	  delay.	  (3)	  A	  governing	  body	  would	  be	  established	  from	  the	  CLIBOR	  participating	  banks,	  representatives	  of	  CLIBOR	  users,	  and	  other	  independent	  parties	  such	  as	  academics.	  That	  governing	  body	  would	  enter	  into	  a	  long-­‐term	  contract,	  based	  on	  competitive	  solicitation,	  with	  a	  private	  sector	  entity	  to	  supervise	  the	  CLIBOR,	  operate	  the	  data-­‐clearing	  house,	  and	  disseminate	  information. 
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I. Summary 
 
1. The Wheatley Review released its Initial Discussion Paper (the “Discussion 
Paper”) on August 10, 2012 and has sought comments on its preliminary findings 
and recommendations on how to reform the London Interbank Offered Rate 
(“LIBOR”).1 
2. This submission presents an alternative to the LIBOR that would in our view: 
a. Eliminate or significantly reduce the severe defects in the LIBOR which 
lead the Discussion Paper to conclude that continuing with the current 
system is “not a viable option;”2 
b. Provide a transparent and reliable measure of interbank lending rates 
during normal times as well as financial crises; 
c. Minimize disruptions to the market; and,  
d. Provide parties relying on the LIBOR with a standard that would maintain 
continuity with the LIBOR. 
3. This alternative, which we call the “Committed” LIBOR (CLIBOR), would: 
a. Require banks that participate in the CLIBOR to submit committed bid 
and ask quotes for interbank lending.  Any transactions which occur after 
that submission (and before the next submission) must be at rates no 
higher than the submitted ask quote and no lower than the submitted bid 
quote.  A penalty would be paid for any transaction which occurs outside 
the submitted bid-ask range, unless such transaction can be justified by the 
bank; 
b. Require banks above a certain size to report their interbank borrowing and 
lending transactions to a data-clearing house similar to the TRACE system 
that was established for corporate bonds in the US.  This would increase 
substantially the number of banks for which reliable transaction-based 
data are available and provide not only a source for verification of the 
committed bids and asks, but also a (one-day lagged) alternative 
benchmark of interbank borrowing rates; 
c. Establish a governance body for the data clearing and interbank lending 
rate reporting operations that would consist of representatives of banks, 
private parties that have a stake in the LIBOR, and perhaps academics or 
other independent parties; 
d. Have the CLIBOR governance body select through a public bid an 
organization to manage the data clearing house and CLIBOR rate setting 
process and dissemination; 
e. Have the selected organization publish the daily interbank lending rates 
for relevant maturities and currencies, verify that each bank transacts 
consistently with its own quoted ask and bid, determine and collect 
penalties as needed, and address banks with an excessive frequency of 
penalties; and, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The Wheatley Review of LIBOR: Initial Discussion Paper, August 2012. 
2 Id., pp. 3, 9.	  
3 Rosa Abrantes-Metz, Michael Kraten, Albert Metz, & Gim Seow, 2012. “LIBOR Manipulation?“ Journal 
of Banking and Finance, 36: 136-150, first draft dated August 2008 and available at 
2 Id., pp. 3, 9.	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f. Have the selected organization develop algorithms for calculating the 
CLIBOR in ways that would minimize the opportunity for abuse and 
regularly employ screening methods for detecting collusion and 
manipulation. 
4. All of the recommendations we make here could be, and in our view should be, 
adapted for other benchmarks such as the EURIBOR, the TIBOR and other 
comparable rates. 
5. We make a few brief remarks on our qualifications for presenting these 
recommendations and refer the Wheatley Review to our attached curriculum 
vitae. 
a. Professor Rosa Abrantes-Metz is the co-author of a paper which 
identified, through econometric screening methods, possible problems 
with the LIBOR in 2008.  Her paper addressed not only the possibility of 
manipulation but also collusion among the contributing banks.3  The U.K. 
House of Commons discussed Professor Abrantes-Metz’s various papers 
on LIBOR during its preliminary findings on July 3 2012, and in the 
subsequent testimonies of Mr. Bob Diamond and Mr. Paul Tucker.4  The 
U.K. House of Commons Treasury Committee has also cited her work in 
its preliminary findings in August 18, and so have other governmental 
investigators.5  Professor Abrantes-Metz specializes on conspiracies and 
manipulations and on the development of empirical screens to detect 
cheating and defend against such allegations.  Professor Abrantes-Metz 
has a Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Chicago. 
b. Professor David S. Evans has written widely on the financial services 
industry and on its regulation.  He was an adviser to the U.S. House 
Financial Services Committee during 2009 and has testified before the 
U.S. Congress on financial services matters on several occasions.  He has 
also written widely on competition policy and has testified before the 
European General Court and many U.S. Federal Courts.  He is the 
Executive Director of the Jevons Institute for Competition Law and 
Economics at University College London where he also serves as a 
Visiting Professor.6  Professor Evans has a Ph.D. in Economics from the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Rosa Abrantes-Metz, Michael Kraten, Albert Metz, & Gim Seow, 2012. “LIBOR Manipulation?“ Journal 
of Banking and Finance, 36: 136-150, first draft dated August 2008 and available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1201389. 
4 “Libor, Public Inquires & FSA Disciplinary Process,” House of Commons, Business and Transportation 
Section, July 3 2012, available at www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN06376.pdf;  House of Commons 
Oral Evidence Taken before the Treasury Committee, Evidence from Bob Diamond, July 4 2012, to be 
published as HC 481-i, available at  
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmtreasy/uc481/uc48101.htm;  House of 
Commons Oral Evidence Taken before the Treasury Committee, Evidence from Paul Tucker, July 9 2012, 
to be published as HC 481-ii, available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmtreasy/uc481-ii/uc48101.htm; 
5 “Fixing Libor: Some Preliminary Findings,” Second Report of Session 2012-13, Volume I, House of 
Commons Treasury Committee, August 18, 2012, available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmtreasy/481/48102.htm. 
6 As a statement of interest, Professor Abrantes-Metz has been retained by various plaintiffs that have filed 
or are considering filing lawsuits against the banks that participated in the setting of LIBOR and other 
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University of Chicago.   
 
 
II. Why an Interbank Lending Rate is Necessary 
 
6. The LIBOR is a benchmark for costs of unsecured borrowing in the London 
interbank market for a small group of highly rated banks (i.e. banks with minimal 
credit risk).  These costs reflect compensation for the interest rate (the time value 
of money), credit premium (counterparty risk), and liquidity premium (market 
depth) that a bank with a similar credit risk profile should expect to be offered by 
another highly rated bank. 
7. During normal economic times, the counterparty risk of the participating banks is 
quite low (by construction) and the interbank market depth is adequate, which 
means that during normal times the LIBOR is highly correlated with other low 
risk/high liquidity rates such as Treasury rates of equal tenor.  It may seem that a 
separate interbank index would be unnecessary. 
8. Unfortunately, the correlation between the interbank lending rate and other 
market rates breaks down during a financial crisis.  During a crisis, a flight to 
quality may drive down the yields on “risk-free” instruments like Treasury-bills at 
precisely the same time that the liquidity and credit premium demanded by 
interbank lenders are likely to rise.7  Additionally, during those times the market 
segmentation between short term borrowing and lending to which the LIBOR 
pertains, and longer tenor borrowing and lending as typically represented in 
corporate bonds and credit default swaps, is likely to increase.  Hence, during a 
financial crisis there is no obviously equivalent market-based benchmark to the 
true costs of short-term interbank lending.  This, of course, is precisely when 
having such a benchmark is of the most interest. 
9. As discussed in the Wheatley Review, the Treasury bill, the Overnight Indexed 
Swap and other existing market-based benchmarks may be close to representing 
the same information as the LIBOR. But, depending on the circumstances, these 
can also differ significantly from each other due to the different types of premia 
that each of these incorporate. 
10. This is not just a theoretical argument.  Market participants have chosen to use the 
LIBOR for contracts having a notional value of more than $300 trillion and 
possibly much more.  Putting aside the defects in the LIBOR, which we will turn 
to shortly, these market participants, most of which were not the banks that set the 
LIBOR, presumably believed that the LIBOR was conceptually the best rate to 
rely on and that it was superior to other readily available benchmarks such as the 
Treasury-bill or the Overnight Indexed Swap.  
11. It must therefore be recognized that the interbank lending rate is distinct from a 
“risk free rate,” and it may be difficult to extrapolate from longer tenor borrowing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
comparable benchmarks; Professor Evans has worked for numerous clients in the financial services 
industry including banks but is not currently working for any party on issues related directly or indirectly to 
LIBOR.  Abrantes-Metz is a Principal of Global Economics Group, LLC and Evans is Chairman of Global 
Economics Group.	  
7  The TED spread of LIBOR over Treasury rates becomes larger and more volatile during crises. 
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rates.  It must furthermore be recognized that for many purposes, it is an interbank 
lending rate and not a “risk free rate” which is the most appropriate benchmark 
for banks and investors to use.  Defining their retail lending costs as a spread over 
LIBOR allows average banks (of lesser credit quality) to pass on changes in their 
funding costs to borrowers throughout the duration of the loan.  For example, if a 
bank wants to sell an adjustable rate mortgage, defining its cost as a spread over 
LIBOR allows it to minimize its basis risk between the rate it charges the 
consumer and the cost of the bank’s funds. 
12. Therefore, we conclude that information on the interbank lending rate is valuable 
to market participants and should continue to be compiled into a benchmark 
though significant changes would have to be implemented to make it reliable, 
robust and to restore its credibility.  
 
 
III. Why a Committed Quote System is Necessary 
 
13. Having established the need for an interbank borrowing index, as distinct from 
some other available rates, the next question is whether a purely transactions-
based index is possible.  During normal economic times, it is likely that there 
would be a sufficient volume of transactions at the short end of the maturity scale 
and that a central data clearing house, which does not currently exist, could 
compile data on actual interbank exchanges, perhaps augmented by commercial 
paper rates for example, and publish a suitable index.8 
14. Such a transactions-based index would of course operate on a delay, since it 
would be calculated ex-post of actual exchanges.  That delay might be slight and 
arguably immaterial during normal economic times.  But a transaction-based 
index may suffer drawbacks during periods of stress.  First, it may become 
volatile as the composition of banks which actually execute interbank exchanges 
may change, and change significantly, on a daily basis.  During a crisis, when 
liquidity is short and market depth is slight, a few large banks entering or exiting 
the interbank lending market may induce spurious volatility in a transactions-
based index. 
15. During a genuine and severe financial crisis, a transactions-based index may be 
undefined.  There may not be any transactions in the appropriate currency at the 
appropriate tenor.  A purely transactions-based index could, in the limit, break 
down altogether. 
16. The only way to ensure continuity of the benchmark, even during the depths of a 
liquidity freeze or financial crisis, is to base the index on quotes provided by the 
banks as opposed to an ex-post calculation of actual transactions which could 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Notice that a transactions-based index has previously been put forward by Abrantes-Metz, in “Why and 
How Should the Libor be Reformed?” Competition Policy International Chronicle, July (1) 2012; first draft 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2094542.  In this article, Abrantes-Metz 
recommends the LIBOR to be based on actual transactions from the previous day rates and an estimate of 
the change in borrowing cost for the current day, in order to avoid delay or early morning LIBOR 
publication.  Such a proposal is, of course, conditional of transactions data availability.  Increased oversight 
of the submissions and expansion of the number of contributing banks were also recommended.  
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potentially cease to exist.  But such quotes need to represent a commitment by the 
banks to actually transact at those rates and be verifiable against actual 
transactions every time those occur. 
 
 
IV. Defects in the Libor Rate Setting Process 	  
17. The Discussion Paper provides an accurate summary of how the LIBOR was 
supposed to work and how it appears to have been manipulated based on 
information provided by Barclay’s in the course of the investigation.  We provide 
a brief summary and highlight several points that warrant consideration in 
devising an alternative. 
18. Each day a handful of banks—up to 18 depending on the currency—are queried 
on how much they could borrow funds from other banks for loans in various 
currencies and maturities.  The central party that calculates the LIBOR disregards 
the highest 25% and lowest 25% of the submissions and takes a simple average of 
the remainder.  In the case of the USD LIBOR there were 16 banks participating 
during the period of the alleged manipulation.  On a daily basis, the contributing 
banks are surveyed by the British Bankers Association and submit sealed quotes 
which answer “[a]t what rate could you borrow funds, were you to do so by 
asking for and then accepting interbank offers in a reasonable market size just 
prior to 11:00 a.m. London time?”  The USD LIBOR is then computed by 
averaging over the middle eight quotes and disregarding the four highest and the 
four lowest. 
19. In making these submissions to the central party, the banks are asked to provide 
estimates of their borrowing rates in the interbank market for that day.  
Importantly, they are not asked to report whether they used that rate for an actual 
transaction, neither do they commit that they will, nor is there any post-
submission auditing process to determine whether the rate they submitted did in 
fact correspond or was close to what was actually charged and paid in any 
transaction.  
20. From the Barclay’s investigation and testimony before the Treasury Committee of 
the House of Commons it appears that its traders held sufficiently large positions 
so that a movement of the LIBOR by one basis point (that is the second decimal 
point of the rate) could be material to them.  Some traders at Barclays apparently 
persuaded the individuals who submitted the quotes to modify those rates in ways 
beneficial to the traders.  Barclays has provided information that indicates that its 
traders conspired with traders at other banks to manipulate the LIBOR.  
Additionally, it appears that in some cases Barclays refrained from submitting 
high borrowing rates because doing so would signal to the market that it faced 
significant risks.  
21. Thus, the record suggests that at least some banks had incentives to manipulate 
the LIBOR, and that at least some banks had the means to do so.  It is widely 
expected that more evidence from other banks will emerge from the many 
ongoing worldwide investigations. 
22. The LIBOR rate setting process was apparently compromised.  But in fact, in 
7 	  
many respects its structure was inherently flawed, providing incentives and 
opportunities for banks to manipulate the rate and providing a means for tacit or 
explicit collusion by the banks. 
a. The contributing banks are asked to report at what rate they could borrow 
money.  They do not have to report real transaction prices when these exist 
and they have no obligation to transact at any rate close to their submitted 
quote.  They have no incentive (beyond “goodwill”) to report an accurate 
rate, and they face no penalty for reporting an inaccurate one.  It is well 
known in the survey design literature that such hypothetical questions 
typically do not elicit accurate answers.9 
b. There is no mechanism for auditing the accuracy of rates submitted by the 
banks.  There are no penalties for submitting rates that appear wrong.  
There are no efforts to verify, in any way, the rates ex post or provide any 
deterrence against the submission of unreliable data. 
c. The rates submitted by the bank each day are made publicly available on 
the same day with the identity of each submitter disclosed.  As a result it is 
possible for each bank to learn the others’ submissions in time to influence 
its own submission for the following day.  This provides a facilitating 
device for tacit collusion, but also for explicit collusion in which banks 
can determine whether other banks have followed agreements to fix rates 
and punish any deviations from such agreements.  It is well known in 
competition policy that such facilitating devices can aid and abet price 
fixing and bid rigging.10 
d. The rates are determined through the submission of a small number of 
banks—currently no more than 18 and as few as 6 depending on the 
currency.  It is well known from the economic literature and antitrust work 
on cartels that it is easier to coordinate either tacitly or explicitly when 
there are a small number of market participants.11 
e. The process for calculating the LIBOR makes it particularly easy for 
banks to submit quotes that with a high degree of confidence could cause a 
material movement in the LIBOR.  The following calculation provides a 
rough approximation to the direct influence of a bank’s offer on the 
LIBOR.  A priori, in 50 percent of the cases each bank’s quote will be 
included in the interquartile range.  Index the bank that is trying to 
influence LIBOR by 1. Then the calculated rate is x1/8 + (x2/8 + x3/8 + 
x4/8 + x5/8 + x6/8 + x7/8 + x8/8).  Submitting a bid that is 8 basis points 
over the average would increase the average by 1 basis point if the bank’s 
submission is in the interquartile range and if such submission does not 
alter the composition and submissions of the remaining seven banks 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 See, for example , Glenn Harrison and E. Elisabet Rutstrom, 2008. “Experimental Evidence of 
Hypothetical Bias in Value Elicitation Methods,” Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, 1: 752-
767.  
10 See, for example,  Margaret Levenstein and Valerie Suslow, 2006. “What Determines Cartel Success,” 
Journal of Economic Literature, 44(1): 43-95.  
11 Id.  For a review of more factors influencing the susceptibility of a market to collusion, see American Bar 
Association Editions, 2010, “Proof of Conspiracy Under Federal Antitrust Laws,” Chapter VIII on 
Economic Expert Testimony. 
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counting for the average. 
f. The bank cannot be certain that it will directly move the LIBOR because 
its submission could be discarded.  However, the bank knows that even if 
its submission is discarded, it may well still have a material effect on the 
final value of LIBOR.  Hence, if the bank benefits from a higher LIBOR 
rate it will have an incentive to submit a quote higher than what it believes 
the average rate is because there is a positive probability that by 
submitting a higher quote it directly increase the LIBOR.  
g. Let’s suppose a situation in which a bank’s submission belongs to the set 
of “too high quotes” that do not directly count for the LIBOR 
computation. Even then its quote could move the rate.  To illustrate our 
point, here is a very simple example.  The 16 banks offer the following 
submissions to the LIBOR: {5.01; 5.02; 5.03; 5.04; 5.05; 5.06; 5.07; 5.08; 
5.09; 5.10; 5.11; 5.12; 5.13; 5.14; 5.15; 5.16}, and suppose these are 
truthful submissions.  Given this set, the quotes {5.01; 5.02; 5.03; 5.04; 
5.13; 5.14; 5.15; 5.16} are discarded, and the 8 in the middle are averaged 
to yield a LIBOR of 5.085.  Now suppose that the bank which in the 
example above submitted 5.08 has an interest in moving the rate upwards.  
Rather than submitting a quote of 5.08, it could submit a quote of, say, 
5.22, which belongs to the four highest quotes for the day and will 
therefore be discarded.  Now the quotes which will count are {5.05; 5.06; 
5.07; 5.09; 5.10; 5.11; 5.12; 5.22}, yielding a LIBOR of 5.1025, an 
increase of 1.75 basis points with respect to the LIBOR under the truthful 
submission of 5.08. 
h. In addition to being vulnerable to the actions of a single bank, the current 
LIBOR setting is also highly susceptible to coordination among multiple 
banks.  When only 16 banks contribute to LIBOR, a coalition of just five 
banks can be guaranteed to be able to move the rate.  Suppose that 5 
banks are interested in moving the LIBOR downwards, and with that 
objective, they all submit low quotes.  If these are all sufficiently low, they 
will be the five lowest of the 16 submissions; four will be discarded, but 
the fifth lowest will directly enter the LIBOR calculation for that day.  
And since it was artificially low, so will be the resulting LIBOR. 
Moreover, and just as with the example above of manipulation by one 
single bank, it is easy to illustrate situations in which a cartel of just 2 
banks may effectively move the LIBOR even when their quotes are 
disregarded.  
i. The governance of the LIBOR setting process rests with banks that have a 
financial interest in the outcome of the LIBOR, and this is a problem on its 
own.   
23. The LIBOR setting process is based on a fundamentally and predictably flawed 
design.  Given that the current setting provided the means, the motive and the 
opportunity to conspire and manipulate the rate, considering the recent evidence 
of apparently widespread manipulation, we agree with the Discussion Paper that 
the current process is “not a viable option.” 
24. Unfortunately, changing LIBOR is a challenging task.  There are two main 
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problems.  The first is that there are more than $300 trillion of contracts 
outstanding tied to the LIBOR.  It is not possible to simply end it.  Doing so 
would result in massive renegotiation costs, lawsuits and disrupted financial 
markets.  The second is that though the information from interbank borrowing and 
lending is valuable and can increase market efficiency, there is no obvious 
substitute for a market-based benchmark that is also guaranteed to provide useful 
information during a financial crisis. 
25. Of course it is possible that a poor proxy for the interbank lending rate is better 
than an unreliable and manipulated rate.  But if the goal is an enhanced and more 
robust measure of interbank lending, then a new benchmark needs to be designed 
and implemented.  
 
 
V.  Replacing the LIBOR 
 
26. Basic principles of antitrust, financial market regulation, survey design, and the 
design of governance systems support the adoption of several guiding principles 
in developing an alternative to the LIBOR: 
a. The rates provided to the market should be based on actual transactions 
where possible.12  
b. The banks should have a financial stake in the accuracy of submitted rates 
not based on actual transactions. 
c. The formula for establishing the index should be based on methods that 
minimize the ability of submitters singly or in combination to affect the 
rate. 
d. The process should integrate basic screening methods for detecting the 
submission of false information or efforts to manipulate the rate. 
e. The influence of parties who have a financial stake in the outcome of the 
rate setting process should be minimized. 
f. The public release of banks’ submissions should be delayed by at least one 
month so that coordination of submissions and manipulation due to 
signaling concerns can be minimized and the identity of the banks making 
each submission should not be disclosed. 
27. Our proposal meets these criteria while we do not believe that any of the other 
proposals, including those alluded to in the Discussion Paper, do. 
28. Our proposal involves three major and interdependent components: 
a. A process for determining the daily interbank lending and borrowing 
same-day rate where the bids are not necessarily based on actual 
transactions but are verified against actual transactions every time these 
take place.  We call the resulting rate the “CLIBOR” for Committed 
LIBOR. 
b. A data-clearing house for reporting interbank lending and borrowing 
transactions that would provide historical rate data and thereby provide 
both a check of the same-day rates and possibly an alternative benchmark 
that would be less current but potentially more accurate.  We call the data-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 At the least, any submissions have to be verifiable against actual transactions whenever those take place.  
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clearing house the “Transaction Reporting for Interbank Borrowing 
Entity” or “TRIBE.” 
c. A system for ensuring the integrity of the data collection and reporting in 
which the regular involvement of self-interested participants is minimized.  
In our view TRIBE would be responsible for, and have a fiduciary duty in, 
the CLIBOR process as well as collecting and reporting historical 
transaction data. 
 
 
A. Process for Determining Same-day Committed London Interbank 
Offered Rate 
 
29. We propose the CLIBOR be based on committed bid and ask quotes submitted by 
contributing banks early in the day and verifiable by actual transactions whenever 
these exist.  The committed ask for the 3 month tenor would answer the question, 
“what is the maximum rate at which you would be willing to borrow $N for three 
months from one of the contributing banks?”  The committed bid would answer 
the question, “what is the minimum rate at which you would be willing to lend $N 
for three months to one of the contributing banks?” 
30. The CLIBOR would be calculated as the midpoint of the inside spread (the 
midpoint between the lowest bid and the highest spread) across all contributing 
banks.  We believe further work should attempt to develop algorithms for refining 
this measure so that it presents the most accurate figure for the market and 
minimizes possibilities of cheating.  We note that other entities that must rely on 
indices that can be manipulated, such as search-engine platforms, have developed 
sophisticated procedures for minimizing and detecting manipulation. 
31. Banks would have to agree that they would conduct transactions within their bid-
ask ranges, hence the meaning of the commitment.  A bank that submitted an 
artificially low ask quote would effectively lock itself out from borrowing that 
day, unless a penalty is paid.  A bank that submitted an artificially high bid quote 
would effectively lock itself out from lending that day, unless a penalty is paid.  
Hence, actual transactions would usually take place between these extremes and 
the incentive to manipulate quotes would be significantly reduced given that these 
are not only committed but also verifiable when any transactions actually take 
place.  Further work should ensure that this process does not impair the interbank 
lending market and modify the commitment parameters and penalties as need be. 
32. TRIBE would evaluate submissions ex-post against actual transactions which take 
that place during the day.  It would be expected that each bank would be 
borrowing at any rate below its quoted ask, but banks would not be completely 
barred from entering into transactions outside of the bid-ask ranges.  If it 
happened that a bank borrowed above that value, it would be required to explain 
that transaction to the oversight agency.  Similarly, each bank would be expected 
to lend at its bid quote or higher, and in case it lent below its bid it would be 
required to explain that decision.  TRIBE would establish penalties for doing so 
where those penalties would increase for multiple transgressions.  As a result 
banks that either made a mistake in their submission, or faced circumstances they 
didn’t anticipate when making their submission, would not be barred from 
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entering into a transaction subject to the penalty.  
33. TRIBE would match actual transactions to the bid-asks and impose the penalties.  
It would also obtain an explanation from the bank for the deviation, and it would 
have the power to forgive a penalty if the explanation provided by the bank was 
legitimate (i.e., principles to be set for this rule, but an example could be a last 
minute liquidity emergency unpredictable at the time of the submission).  
Transgressions and penalties would be monitored and a bank incurring more than 
a reservation number of penalties (to be determined) in the period of a month 
would have to be further monitored to justify the reason(s) for such a high 
frequency of transgressions.  
34. It may be necessary for the government to require the banks that have been 
participating in the LIBOR rate setting, and all large banks, to participate in the 
CLIBOR process.  Further consideration would need to be given as to the criteria 
for requiring banks to participate in the CLIBOR process and whether this 
requirement should be for a transitional period (five years for example) or 
permanent.   
 
 
B. Transaction Reporting for Interbank Borrowing Entity (TRIBE) 
 
35. Although one could debate whether providers of bespoke financial transactions 
should be required to make public disclosures, we believe that the serious doubts 
that have been raised about integrity of the LIBOR, the evidence concerning its 
manipulation and possible collusion, and the need for an auditing mechanism 
going forward tip the balance in favor of full transparency.  Therefore we are 
proposing that banks be required to disclose to the data clearing house the bid and 
asks rates and other detailed terms on funds they have borrowed from or lent to 
another bank.  To prevent the disclosure of proprietary information the data-
clearing house would keep the identity of each bank confidential and only report 
aggregated information. 
36. This data-clearing house is similar to the TRACE system for corporate bonds in 
the US.  Most corporate bonds have been sold privately at least since the end of 
World War II,13 and little public information was available on the prices that 
corporate bonds were sold for until about a decade ago.  At the beginning of 2001 
the National Association of Securities Dealers required that dealers report detailed 
information including prices on the National Association of Securities Dealers’14 
transaction reporting and compliance engine (TRACE).  Much of the TRACE 
data were then made publicly available and different types of bonds were phased 
in over time.  Three major academic studies have examined the effect of the 
introduction of TRACE on the corporate bond market.15  All found that investor’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Bruno Biais and Richard Green, 2005. “The Microstructure of the Bond Market in the 20th Century,” 
GSIA Working Papers, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business (E57). 
14 NASD is now FINRA. 
15 Hendrik Bessembinder, William Maxwell, and Kumar Venkataraman, 2006. “Market Transparency, 
Liquidity Externalities, and Institutional Trading Costs in Corporate Bonds,” Journal of Financial 
Economics, 82: 251-88; Amy Edwards, Lawrence Harris and Michael Piwowar, 2007. “Corporate Bond 
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trading costs declined substantially and two estimated the savings at $1 billion 
annually.16 
37. Under our proposal, the requirement that banks submit information on interbank 
lending and borrowing transactions would be extended to all large banks 
including banks that are not currently participating in the LIBOR.  
38. The TRIBE transaction data could be used to develop an alternative benchmark 
based on actual transaction data.  It would not be possible for this benchmark to 
be of same day rates.  But the benchmark could possibly be based on the previous 
day’s rates for maturities and currencies for which there were enough transactions 
and for longer periods for more thinly traded maturities and currencies.  
Alternative benchmarks would need to account for the fact that the risk profiles of 
these banks and therefore their likely borrowing rates could differ. 
 
 
C. TRIBE Governance 
 
39. We believe that the banks providing the information on interbank borrowing 
should have minimal involvement in running TRIBE which would be responsible 
for the CLIBOR as well as the TRIBE data reporting.  These banks clearly have 
an interest in the CLIBOR result because of their trading positions, and with a 
small number of institutions they could engage in tacit or explicit collusion.  In 
addition, given the liability and reputational damage they may have incurred from 
the LIBOR process to date they may wisely decide that they do not want to 
continue in a governing capacity. 
40. One possibility is for the Bank of England or the Financial Conduct Authority or 
some other governmental entity to assume responsibility for TRIBE.  However, 
given the importance of innovation in the collection and dissemination of these 
data to the financial markets, and the many other tasks that financial regulators 
have, we believe it would be better for TRIBE to be run by a private sector firm. 
41. One model for TRIBE are the data collection and reporting providers which 
collect and report audience data.  In most countries including the UK, media 
companies issue a request for proposals for collecting and reporting data on their 
audiences for the purpose of providing reliable data to advertisers.  They typically 
issue a long-term contract of about 10 years.  During this period the contract 
recipient can be fired only for failing to fulfill the terms of contract.  Part of the 
negotiation concerns the price of the data. 
42. In the case of TRIBE, we propose the establishment of a governance body that 
would be responsible for selecting and monitoring a vendor.  The governance 
body should consist of representatives of all market participants including banks 
that are participating in CLIBOR, representatives of other institutions that rely on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Market Transparency and Transaction Costs,” Journal of Finance, 62: 1421-1451; Michael Goldstein, 
Edith Hotchkiss and Erik Sirri, 2007. “Transparency and Liquidity: A Controlled Experiment on Corporate 
Bonds,” Review of Financial Studies, 2(2): 235-273. For a summary, see William F. Maxwell and Hendrik 
Bessembinder, 2008. “Transparency and the Corporate Bond Market,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 
22(2): 217-234. 
16 Bessembinder, Maxwell, and Venkataraman (2006), supra note 15. 
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the CLIBOR, and independent parties such as academic experts.  The governance 
body would refine the proposal described above and hire a vendor to implement 
it.   
43. A regulatory body would sit above the CLIBOR governance body and TRIBE.  
That body could require, receive, and audit reports and conduct examinations of 
the CLIBOR governance body and TRIBE.  The regulatory body could be the 
Bank of England or the Financial Conduct Authority or consist of an interagency 
body created for this purpose. In the first instance, the regulatory body would 
select the CLIBOR governing body in consultation with the participating banks 
and other market participants. 
44. The operational costs associated with the CLIBOR could be significant, but in our 
view any serious alternative to the LIBOR will also require a high level of 
operational costs. In any event these costs would be small relative to the value of 
the LIBOR for financial markets. 
45. Finally, as suggested in the Wheatley review, it may be worth extending the types 
of funding transactions relevant for the CLIBOR to also incorporate wholesale 
deposits, and to consider reducing the number of currencies in which LIBOR is 
denominated, as well as maturities.  
 
 
D. The Transition 
 
46. The Discussion Paper expresses concern that making significant changes to the 
LIBOR would result in market disruption.  The experience with the introduction 
of the euro suggests that these can be managed.  By all means, the transition to the 
euro was extremely successful.  
47. The European Commission provided the continuity in contractual relationships by 
establishing that national currency values be replaced by euro equivalent at the 
fixed conversion rate in any legal documents.17  In the United States, some states 
such as New York, California and Illinois enacted similar laws to address the 
conversion to the euro.  There were no material disruptions in financial markets 
during that period.  
48. The transition phase to the euro was well prepared and happened smoothly over 
the space of few years. The same could happen in transitioning to the CLIBOR 
which, in our proposal, provides continuity with the LIBOR as a benchmark for 
interbank lending. 	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 European Commission, 1997. “Legal Framework for the Use of the Euro,” II/088/97-EN, Brussels, 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication_summary1056_en.htm. 
